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WYOMING LAW REVIEW






It is almost a given among regulators and the regulated alike that
few parties, if any, are in compliance with all relevant regulations all of
the time. What taxpayer does not blanch when receiving notification of
an Internal Revenue Service audit? A fine-tooth inspection of any tax
return will likely reveal some filing or calculation errors, as will most
any searching audit in any highly regulated field, whether securities,
insurance, or others. In environmental law, though, the problem of non-
compliance seems far more severe. Studies by the General Accounting
Office have consistently found significant noncompliance with the Clean
Water Act.' An EPA "Enforcement Alert" newsletter noted that "when
* Professor, Washington College of Law, American University.
** Professor, The Florida State University College of Law.
* Associate Professor, The Florida State University Department of Statistics.
1. The General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] study found that a remark-
able 41 % of industrial users were not complying with the pretreatment discharge limits
for publicly owned treatment works. Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1207-1208, citing
U.S. GAO, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT NEEDED
FOR Toxic POLLUTANTS ENTERING SEWERS, GAO/RCED-89-101, at 3 (1989). A later
GAO study of EPA compliance data from 1992-1994 revealed that 18-27% of major
facilities were in "significant noncompliance." U.S. GAO, WATER POLLUTION: MANY
VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT RECEIVED APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION, REPORT To
THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
U.S. SENATE I GAO/RCED-96-23, at 4 (1996), cited in David L. Markell, The Role of
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EPA looks closely at an industry sector, usually it discovers a high rate
of noncompliance. 2 A survey of general counsel at major corporations
in the early 1970s, for example, revealed that "two-thirds believed their
businesses had operated, at least some time in the prior year, in violation
of environmental laws. Nearly seventy percent indicated that they did
not believe absolute compliance was achievable."3 And California's
guide for prosecution of hazardous materials violations openly admits
that "no facility of moderate complexity which handles hazardous mate-
rials or wastes . . . can be expected to be in full compliance at all
times."4
These and many others suggest we have reached an unsettling
situation where the regulated community does not believe it is, or can be,
Deterrence Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Di-
vide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 55 (2000) [hereinafter
Markell]. Other studies have also shown very high levels of noncompliance.
Wes Magat and Kip Viscusi's 1990 study of Clean Water Act compliance in the
paper industry, which estimated a seventy-five percent compliance rate with effluent
limitations. Looking beyond the Clean Water Act context, John Brehm and James Ham-
ilton's 1996 study of compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986 found similar compliance rates, while an analysis of inspection
data by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection in 1997 found that
about ten percent of all inspections revealed violations of environmental laws meriting
enforcement action. The Environmental Protection Agency's [hereinafter EPA] Sector
Facility Indexing Project (SFIP) assembles enforcement data for facilities in several
heavy industries including rough measurements of compliance with the Clean Air Act,
Clean Water Act, and RCRA. Over eight quarterly periods spanning August 1996 to
August 1998, participating facilities averaged at least one "noncompliance event" in 3.8
of those quarterly periods (almost half the time). Not only are all of these studies fairly
consistent with one another, they seem consistent with prior EPA estimates of noncom-
pliance rates. David Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role
of RationalActor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 966-967 (2001)
[hereinafter Spence].
2. OFFICE OF REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT, U.S. EPA, COMPLIANCE WITH
PERMITTING CRITICAL TO CLEAN AIR ACT GOALS: EPA CONCERNED ABOUT
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH NEW SOURCE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS, ENFORCEMENT ALERT, at 4
(Jan. 1999), cited in Markell, supra note 1, at 57.
3. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1202 (1998) (hereinafter Recht-
schaffen). Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
30, 1993, at S1. Almost half said their most time intensive task was determining if their
facility was in compliance. To be sure, one needs to regard such admissions of failure
with caution. There are obvious, self-serving reasons why regulated industries would be
expected to claim full compliance is unachievable. They surely want more lenient
treatment when violations are discovered.
4. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILITY I-1 (1992), quoted in Rechtschaf-
fen, supra note 3, at 1202.
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in compliance with environmental law. But why? Is environmental law a
magnet for corporate scofflaws? Is significant noncompliance inevitable,
despite best efforts? And what should be done to address such high lev-
els of noncompliance? As modem environmental law enters its fourth
decade, a great deal of introspection is taking place over these issues.5
Literature on the behavioral dimension of compliance is domi-
nated by two models, each based on different conceptions over what is
happening at the firm level. One school of thought portrays compliance
as simply the result of rational actor behavior. Profit-maximizing com-
panies weigh the costs and benefits of complying, and skirt or violate the
law based on the bottom line. All noncompliance is voluntary under this
model. The competing view is that many companies are "good apples" to
the core and would comply at higher rates than experienced but for ob-
stacles put in the way, such as ambiguous regulations, constantly shifting
rules, and conflicting mandates. Noncompliance, in this alternative
model, has an important voluntary component.
The debate between proponents of these two models goes well
beyond simply explaining why firms fail to comply. These models have
very different implications for the design of compliance and enforcement
policies and, more specifically, the appropriate roles of sanction-backed
enforcement and compliance facilitation. In simple terms, the choice
between rational actor and good-apple models is equally the choice be-
tween stick or carrot strategies of enforcement. While these strategies
were literally joined together in a single EPA office in 1993 (when the
Office of Enforcement was renamed the Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance), in practice sanction and facilitation have more
often been portrayed as opposing policies.
Much recent scholarship has argued over which is a more accu-
rate model. In this article, by contrast, we suggest that it may not be
enough to know whether companies generally fit the rational polluter
model or the good apple model. If, in fact, there are systemic obstacles to
compliance, what we call "regulatory traffic jams," then for some non-
compliance the regulated party's intentions may be largely irrelevant.
For both rational polluters and good apples, at least some companies will
seek to comply at some level and may face externally-imposed barriers
to doing so. Indeed, in two of your authors' experiences providing envi-
ronmental compliance representation to corporations, they witnessed
5. See, e.g., Rechtschaffen, supra note 3; Spence, supra note 1; Richard Lazarus,
Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407 (1995) [hereinafter Lazarus]; Markell,
supra note 1.
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many instances of good faith efforts to comply that still led to viola-
tions.6 While we expressly do not want to take on the role of apologists
for industry, our experiences (and, we believe, those of most people
working in the field) make it both intriguing and important to consider
the possibility of what might well be considered an oxymoron-"good
faith noncompliance"-regulatory violations despite well-funded and
well-intended compliance efforts.
The possibility of such involuntary noncompliance, if signifi-
cant, raises a host of difficult questions. How often does involuntary
noncompliance happen? Why does it happen? Does it result in actual
harm to the environment? And, more generally, what does it mean for
our understanding of compliance and sanction?
In Part II of this article we provide a primer on compliance the-
ory, explaining the dominant models and their implications. In Part III,
we explain what a traffic jam model of compliance performance would
look like. Moving beyond theory, in Part IV we turn to empirical analy-
sis and inform the noncompliance debate through close examination of
two studies. The first study, known as Root Causes, was co-sponsored by
EPA and the Chemical Manufacturers Association from 1996-1998. It
represents one of the most extensive compliance studies to date. The
second was a survey we conducted of members of the ABA's Section on
Environment, Energy, and Resources Law specifically to address the
questions highlighted above. In Part V, we explore the implications of
regulatory traffic jams for environmental protection. While our focus is
on environmental law, we suspect that our findings may be relevant to
other highly regulated fields.
II. A PRIMER ON COMPLIANCE THEORY
As described above, noncompliance appears to have become the
norm in the environmental field. But why? Would full compliance be too
costly? Are the regulations too difficult to follow? Are there too many
rules? Are regulators too lenient? The ultimate goal of compliance the-
ory is to provide insights for how enforcement strategies can best maxi-
mize compliance. But one must first seek to understand why the actors
are failing to comply.
Both the enforcement literature and practice have been domi-
nated by two models. One, which we will call the "rational polluter
6. Prior to academia, Jim Salzman served as the European Environmental Manager
for Johnson Wax for four years. J.B. Ruhl was a partner at Fulbright & Jaworski.
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model," favors an adversarial, deterrence-based approach. The other, the
good apple or "facilitation model," rests on collaborative assistance.
Traditionally, enforcement in the environmental field (as in oth-
ers) has been based on strategic deterrence. In this model of behavior,
the rational actor will comply when it is in his economic self-interest to
do so, but will otherwise violate the law. A profit-maximizing com-
pany's decision to comply simply comes down to comparing the costs
and benefits of noncompliance (i.e., because in some instances crime
does pay). This notion of regulated behavior rests on the assumption that
most noncompliance is due to "bad apples" and, as a result, the appro-
priate enforcement strategy is one of sanction. Malefactors respond most
effectively to punishment.
This approach is so preva'ent that it seems obvious to us,
whether by imposing fines at a chemical facility or adding points to the
license of a speeding driver. Both settings employ a deterrence-based
remedy because, this model predicts, only when the sanction is painful
enough, and the likelihood of detection high enough, will the regulated
party comply.7 In the environmental field, the sufficient pain can take
any number of forms, ranging from public notice of violations,
ineligibility for government contracts, civil penalties and supplemental
environmental projects to injunctions or even jail time.' Regardless of
the final penalty, though, under this behavioral model it goes without
saying that noncompliance is intentional.
With the rational polluter behavioral model as the premise, there-
fore, the deterrence-based sanction approach to enforcement is inevita-
ble. As Chester Bowles, the famous New Deal administrator, memorably
observed: "Twenty percent of the regulated population will automati-
cally comply with any regulation, five percent will attempt to evade it,
and the remaining seventy-five percent will comply as long as they think
that the five percent will be caught and punished." 9
7. Jon Silberman breaks out four factors: certainty that a violator will be caught,
severity of the sanction, celerity of the apprehension and punishment, and the violator's
perception of these. Jon Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence
and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,523, 10,528 (2000) [hereinafter Silberman].
8. Under the Clean Water Act, for example, knowingly endangering others pro-
vides for a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and one million dollars for or-
ganizations, as well as jail sentences up to 15 years for individuals. 33 U.S.C.
1319(c)(3)(A) (1994).
9. CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1941-1969 25
(1971), quoted in Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1223. The Supreme Court has en-
dorsed such an approach, as well, stating in Laidlaw that it is "reasonable for Congress
2002
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Advocates of the rational polluter model may quibble over the
appropriate percentages, but their approach is consistent. Enforcement
against the critical five percent of bad apples through sanctions (known
as "specific deterrence") will ensure that compliance by the rest ("gen-
eral deterrence") will follow. The implication, of course, is that the re-
maining seventy-five percent, while perhaps not rotten to the core, are
certainly willing to skirt the law if they can get away with it.
Evidence of this approach to enforcement is easy to find.'0 The
recent rise of criminal sanctions in environmental law demonstrates the
desire both to increase compliance and send the message that pollution is
serious business." EPA's penalty policy clearly states that penalties
must go beyond any economic benefits gained from noncompliance.'
2
The agency's proud publications of enforcement statistics every year-
the number of site inspections, suits filed, dollars collected, jail sen-
tences served-is regarded as an important proxy for environmental pro-
tection.' Whether EPA or Congress has primarily been responsible for
to conclude that an actual award of civil penalties does in fact bring with it a significant
quantum of deterrence over and above what is achieved by the mere prospect of such
penalties. A would-be polluter may or may not be dissuaded by the existence of a rem-
edy on the books, but a defendant once hit in its pocketbook will surely think twice
before polluting again." Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 186
(2000).
10. As Jon Silberman, an EPA Senior Attorney observes, "The principle of deter-
rence underlies the EPA's compliance monitoring and enforcement program. It is refer-
ences expressly in virtually every EPA enforcement response and penalty policy, and
endorsed in EPA Environmental Appeals Board penalty decisions." Silberman, supra
note 7, at 10,523.
!i. See generally Lazarus, supra note 5 (discussing the standard for criminal prose-
cution of environmental crimes).
12. In assessing civil penalties, it is EPA policy to capture both the economic bene-
fit of the offending activity to the party and the seriousness of the offense. See, e.g.,
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(e) (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1994).
As David Markell describes,
EPA has long held, and continues to hold, the view that traditional, deter-
rence-based enforcement is an essential element of an effective environ-
mental regulatory scheme. Key features of this scheme include sufficient
compliance monitoring to identify violators, initiating formal enforcement
actions against significant violators in a timely and appropriate way, requir-
ing the violator to return to a state of compliance, and imposing monetary
sanctions that penalize the violator by requiring it to pay a fine that exceeds
its economic gain from the noncompliant activity .... The policies use the
concepts of recoupment of a "benefit component" and collection of a "gravity
component" as the tools to achieve this goal.
Markell, supra note 1, at 10, 13.
13. In this regard, consider a 1999 EPA press release declaring enforcement records
for years of jail time for environmental offenses (208), civil penalties ($166.7 million),
258 Vol. 2
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this emphasis on bean-counting is unclear, 14 but the underlying message
is not. More inspections, fines and punishment means better deterrence
and, therefore, better enforcement.
In a sense, this leveraged approach seems unavoidable. Consider
that, in a good year, EPA will conduct about 22,000 inspections leading
to 4000 civil actions; and states (who do the lion's share of enforcement)
will conduct 146,000 inspections and 9000 enforcement actions. 15 Im-
pressive numbers, until one realizes that there are roughly eight million
regulated parties subject to environmental laws.' 6 In other words, a regu-
lated party has about a 2% chance of being inspected (and a 0.16%
chance of being sanctioned) in any given year. As with the tax code,
where the vast majority of taxpayers face little realistic chance of being
audited, establishing a credible deterrent is absolutely necessary. That's
why no distinction is made in environmental law between paperwork and
emissions violations. 17 The EPA must rely on accurate self-monitoring
and reporting by the regulated community.
It is important to note, though, that enforcement statistics may
well not closely correlate with other significant measures such as the
overall level of compliance with environmental rules and, more impor-
tant, the reduction of environmental impacts (the real reason for envi-
ronmental protection, as we will discuss later).'" Thus a significant as-
sumption of the sanction approach is that its effect will go beyond sim-
ply a drop in violations and will lead to broader behavioral changes be-
and injunctive relief ($3.6 billion, primarily Superfund). Press Release, EPA, EPA Sets
Enforcement Records in 1999 (Jan. 19, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov (last
visited April 11, 2002).
14. In a chicken-or-egg problem, Congressional oversight committees demand sta-
tistics from EPA to justify its enforcement budget while EPA generates statistics to
defend the need for greater resources.
15. Silberman, supra note 7, at 10,523.
16. Id.
17. Thus, for example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA may issue fines up to $25,000
per day per violation for a wide range of permitting violations, including both paper-
work requirements and actual emissions violations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7413(b) (1994).
18. EPA, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY 3 (1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oeca/perfmeas/npmsfinal.html (last visited April 11, 2002). Recog-
nition of the limitations of a "bean-counting" approach to enforcement led to the study
cited above, an effort by EPA to reconsider how it should measure its enforcement ac-
tivities to reflect more accurately the goals and progress of enforcement. In 2000, the
EPA launched a million dollar research program for projects examining the relationship
between government enforcement efforts and behavior of the regulated community.
EPA is also awarding $1.8 million in cooperative agreement grants with states to create
and use "outcome-based performance measures." Silberman, supra note 7, at 10,524,
10,535.
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yond compliance, such as adoption of a company audit policy, pollution
prevention strategies, and environmental management systems. 19
This description of compliance has not gone unchallenged, how-
ever. While the sanction model is based on the assumption of regulating
"bad apples," the competing approach assumes that most companies are
"good apples" to the core and would comply at higher rates than experi-
enced but for obstacles put in their way. It's not hard to imagine why
this might be the case and may, in fact, better describe reality than the
sanction model.2°
The most obvious reason for corporate compliance, of course, is
to avoid one or more of the sanctions described above, the "sticks" of
deterrence. But it is important to acknowledge, as well, that the senior
management of some companies is personally committed to conducting
business in an environmentally responsible manner. 21 Reputation mat-
ters, too. Some companies operate in sectors where a poor environmental
reputation can harm them in the marketplace or with their shareholders.22
Others manage environmental reputation as a positive business asset for
corporate image or marketing. 23 And, finally, a growing number of com-
panies are realizing that high levels of environmental management actu-
ally contribute to the bottom line through increased efficiencies.24 There
19. Indeed, the compliance decision of regulated parties is not simply whether or
not to comply but the level of compliance above the minimum (the safety buffer), as
well. See Silberman at 10,524, 10,526 (citations omitted).
20. As David Spence concludes, the rational polluter approach "fails to explain the
behavior of many regulated firms. Because complying with environmental rules is often
prohibitively difficult, a significant percentage of noncompliance is neither intentional
nor reckless." Spence, supra note 1, at 919.
21. See, e.g., Spence, supra note I, at 969-971.
22. The pictures of drivers cutting up their Exxon charge cards following the oil
spill of the Exxon Valdez provides a graphic negative example, as did the intensive
public relations effort by McDonalds to persuade customers that its suppliers did not cut
down rain forest to graze cattle. See George White, 10,000 Angry Credit Card Holders
Deluge Exxon With Plastic, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1989, at BI (discussing disgruntled
Exxon customers returning their gas credit cards); Charles Eberling, Where Big Macs
Grow, N.Y. TIMES, at A22 (discussing the erroneous reports concerning where
McDonalds gets their beef).
23. The corporate image of the Body Shop clearly is strengthened by its environ-
mental policies; and, from an unusual quarter, British Petroleum has been promoting its
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase investments in solar
energy. See Alison Maitland, Due Recognition Given for Effort: The Environment,
LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, at 7 (discussing The Body Shop's reputation for environ-
mental concern, and BP's surprising reputation for their environmentally friendly poli-
cies).
24. See, e.g., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE (GEMI), ENVI-
RONMENT: VALUE TO THE Top LINE (2001), available at http://www.gemi.org/evtl.pdf
Vol. 2
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clearly is something to these arguments when one recalls that, despite
the well-publicized big penalties by EPA, these are relatively infrequent
and the size of most environmental fines is too small, in itself, to change
the bottom line profits for most companies.
So, if many companies have good selfish reasons to comply, why
are they so often in noncompliance? Sanction advocates would point out
that rational polluters, despite the potential benefits listed above, may
still find that crime pays. And, to be sure, no one with experience in en-
vironmental protection would deny that there are bad apples out there.
Much noncompliance is voluntary. One cannot sprinkle pixie dust on bad
apples, hold your breath, and wish them to go away. But if they are in
the small minority, what about the good apples? It turns out that the rea-
sons for well-intentioned failure are numerous. As many have pointed
out, environmental law is complicated. Regulations can be difficult to
understand because they are highly technical.26 They may be ambiguous,
whether intentionally or because of poor drafting.27 They may appear to
contradict other requirements. 28 Given the combination, and occasional
overlap, of federal, state and local regulation of many polluting activi-
ties, this is not hard to imagine. Because of such federalism in practice,
as well as EPA's increasing reliance on guidance documents and other
nonlegislative rules, the relevant requirements may be hard to' find.
29
And, finally, there are a lot of rules, and more so for EPA than other
agencies. 30 Consider that there are over 10,000 pages of federal envi-
http://www.gemi.org/evtl.pdf (last visited April 11, 2002). GEMI has 39 member com-
panies, describing itself as:
a non-profit organization of leading companies dedicated to fostering envi-
ronmental, health and safety excellence worldwide through the sharing of
tools and information in order for business to help business achieve environ-
mental excellence.
See http://www.gemi.org/docs/Company.htm (last visited April 11, 2002).
25. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1192, citing CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL,
WINSTON HARRINGTON & WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS
43 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 5, at 2429-243 1.
27. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419, 1421 (7th Cir. 1990) (where
Judge Richard Posner described the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
as "a statutory Cloud Cuckoo Land").
28. Lazarus, supra note 5, at 2407 ("Conflict and contradiction are the rule rather
than the exception for those hardy enough to go beyond the symbolic rhetoric and prom-
ise of environmental policy in an effort to discover the actual terms of the environ-
mental law itself.").
29. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 5, at 2436-38.
30. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 14-20 (CQ Press, 2d ed. 1999). For EPA's reliance on non-
legislative rules, see Bryan G. Tabler & Mark E. Shere, EPA's Practice of Regulation-
2002
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ronmental laws on the books, not including guidance documents and
state laws.3 When corporate counsels say they can't keep track of all the
requirements of compliance, it is not false modesty.32
If the logical consequence of the rational polluter model is the
punitive deterrence of enforcement, the obvious response to the good
apple model of behavior is compliance facilitation. Helping regulated
parties come into compliance, rather than threatening them to do so, not
only seems more appropriate if parties truly want to comply, but equita-
ble as well. After all, compliance facilitation simply asks that govern-
ment help the good apples overcome obstacles that government largely
created in the first place. And practical evidence of this enforcement
approach is as easy to find as that for the sanction model. 3 The Clinton
Administration launched an effort to reinvent regulation writing, ex-
pressing the rules in plain English.34 EPA has dedicated considerable
resources to outreach and education efforts, publishing numerous reports
such as the Small Business Ombudsman Update and 1-800 toll free help
by-Memo, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1990, at 3; Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You
Want the Permit, Don't You? ": Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind
the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1992).
31. J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed
Environmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245,
281 (1999). See also Henry P. Baer, Jr., ISO 14000: Potential Compliance and Preven-
tion Guidelines for EPA and DOJ, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 927, 949 (1996) (stating that
the Federal Register contains more than 20,000 pages of environmental regulations). In
a law review article written 25 years ago, the former Dean of Stanford Law School,
Bayless Manning, coined the term, "hyperlexis," to describe "American's national dis-
ease-the pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland. Measured
by any and every index, our law is exploding. New statutes, regulations, and ordinances
are increasing at geometric rates at all levels of government. The same is true of re-
ported decisions by courts and administrative agencies." Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis:
Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1977).
32. Indeed, as David Spence has summarized and the Root Causes study, infra, note
63, demonstrates:
Few scholars have attempted to measure the role of ignorance directly, at
least in systematic ways. Brehm and Hamilton's study of compliance with
toxic chemical reporting found that ignorance of the legal requirements ac-
counted for a large portion of the noncompliance with that requirement and
was a much stronger predictor of noncompliance than either evasion or the
costliness of compliance.
Spence, supra note 1, at 972.
33. For a useful survey of EPA's main compliance incentive approaches and com-
pliance assistance strategies (i.e., the Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs)
Policy, Self-Audit Policy, Small Business Compliance Assurance Policy, compliance
assistance tools, and sector notebooks) and see Markell, supra note 1, at 13-26.
34. Cindy Skyrzycki, Gore's Plain-Spoken Directive: Order Calls for Clarity in
Federal Communications, WASH. POST, June 2, 1998, at Al.
Vol. 2262
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lines. Congressional passage of the Small Business Regulatory Enforce-
ment Fairness Act (SBREFA) requires forgiveness for small violations
by small businesses.35 And, over the last decade, at least 23 states have
passed laws providing evidentiary privileges or immunity to corpora-
tions that uncover and correct violations through internal environmental
audits.36 The goal of all these initiatives, and many more, is to rely on
carrots rather than sticks, cooperation rather than confrontation, either by
education or reducing penalties in exchange for coming into compliance.
Not surprisingly, proponents of the sanction model remain un-
convinced. While many scholars and environmental enforcement per-
sonnel acknowledge that numerous challenges to compliance like those
listed above do exist, they reject any conclusion that reliance on sanc-
tions as the principal compliance-inducing mechanism may be inappro-
priate.37 As Cliff Rechtschaffen has bluntly observed, "you don't get to
drive drunk or hold up a store one time for free. 38
In practice, of course, enforcement in the field rarely follows
solely the sanction or facilitation approach but, rather, a hybrid depend-
ing on the situation.39 To paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, compliance facili-
tation may prove effective because the big stick of potential sanction is
held at the ready. Officials may work with a company, let it know in
35. Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1183-84 (citing Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 223, 110 Stat. 857, 862 (1996).
36. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1185.
37. A senior EPA enforcement attorney, for example, says he has regularly encoun-
tered the
unstated assumption that environmental noncompliance is somehow 'differ-
ent' from noncompliance with other laws .... [Supporters of this view]
typically cite one or more of the following rationales in support of this as-
sumption: (1) [U]nlike other lawbreakers who are 'bad' at heart, environ-
mental violators are essentially 'good people'; (2) environmental laws de-
serve to be broken because they illegitimately encroach on personal freedom
and property rights; (3) while the environmental violations themselves are
wrong, the activities which lead to environmental violations have social util-
ity and should not be chilled; or (4) environmental laws are prone to being
violated accidentally due to their complexity.
Silberman, supra note 7, at 10,530.
38. Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1242.
39. Often times, EPA officials will sanction a violation through a warning letter
rather than a fine. Markell, supra note 1, at 13, citing U.S. EPA, OPERATING PRINCIPLES
FOR AN INTEGRATED EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 4
(1996). In other cases, fines will be preceded by efforts to ensure the facility operators
have been provided compliance assistance. Markell, supra note 1, at 13, citing U.S.
GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S AND STATES' EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 14 GAO/RCED-98-113 (1998).
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advance that an inspection is coming, and still file penalties for noncom-
pliance.40 And there is good evidence that both of these approaches
"work." Studies have demonstrated that compliance at facilities is corre-
lated to the frequency of inspections, and that companies are much more
likely to conduct an environmental audit if given advance notice of an
inspection. 41 An oft-cited study of the pulp and paper industry, for ex-
ample, found that "a 10% increase in monitoring activity led to 4% or
greater reductions in the average length of time facilities remained in
noncompliance. 42 Indeed, the recognition that sanctions and compliance
assistance should be complementary was a main reason that Carol
Browner changed the name of EPA's Office of Enforcement to the Of-
fice of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.
Thus deterrence-based sanction and compliance facilitation can
be, and often are, combined. And, in certain cases, they may not be very
useful categories for sorting purposes.43 But make no mistake. They rep-
resent very different views of compliance with far-reaching implications
for immunity for violations found in self-audits, criminal sanctions, and
the very relationship of regulators and regulated parties.44 Through the
eyes of a sanction-based enforcer, compliance facilitation efforts too
often mask examples of agency capture, letting regulated industries off
the hook.45 Through the lens of compliance facilitation, though, sanc-
40. "EPA will expand its use of integrated strategies [that combine compliance
assistance, incentives, monitoring, and enforcement] to address the priorities of the
enforcement and compliance assistance program." EPA, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE: ACTION PLAN FOR INNOVATION, 300-K-
99-003 (Sept. 1999), at 19, as quoted in Silberman supra note 7, at 10,526. In the EPA's
Compliance Incentive Program for the Industrial Organic Chemical sector, for example,
potential targets of enforcement were sent letters in August, 1998, informing them that
they could enroll in the program, be assisted with compliance materials, and would have
a grace period until January 31, 1999, to conduct audits and disclose violations, which
would be accordingly reduced. After this period, EPA would authorize states to in-
crease their inspections of these facilities. Fifty-one facilities participated. Silberman,
supra note 7, at 10,525.
41. Silberman, supra note 7, at 10,531 (citing studies by Price Waterhouse in 1995
nd the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1998).
42. Silberman, supra note 7, at 10,533 (citing Louis Nadeau, EPA Effectiveness at
Reducing the Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 54
(1997).
43. For example, why should compliance to avoid costs of sanction be recognized
as the attribute of a rational polluter while compliance to avoid bad public relations is
that of a good apple? The same economic incentive is driving both actions.
44. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 1, at 985-995. As discussed at the end of Part IV,
it also drives much of the current tension between states and EPA over enforcement
practices.
45. The case, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,
provides the most recent high-profile example. In Laidlaw, which ultimately went to the
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tions can seem heavy-handed and ineffective. Government resources,
many state agencies argue, would be better spent by working with rather
than against regulated parties, preventing noncompliance events and
saving sanctions for the truly bad apples. 6 Moreover, the balance of
sanction versus facilitation remains hotly contested. Thus much of the
debate in environmental enforcement today is over which of these mod-
els should guide enforcement policy.
This discussion over what motivates compliance is surely impor-
tant, for it guides the selection of instruments (sanctions or assistance).
We suggest, however, that focusing on why businesses comply, while
necessary, cannot adequately explain the full range of regulated parties'
noncompliance. This debate is incomplete unless we also consider why
the regulated parties do not comply. Put another way, the debate up to
now has been missing something. Focusing on two models-sanction
and facilitation-to explain noncompliance has left out a third viable
model.
III. A SYSTEMS MODEL OF COMPLIANCE PERFORMANCE
If, in fact, there are systemic obstacles to compliance that lead in
some cases to involuntary noncompliance, it is not enough to know
whether companies are bad apples or good apples, or fit the sanction or
facilitation model, because in any case they will seek to comply at some
Supreme Court, the defendant had violated its Clean Water Act permit hundreds of
times. When a plaintiff served notice that it was bringing a citizen suit, Laidlaw was
able to frustrate the citizen suit because the state commenced an enforcement action
over the same permit violations. It turns out that "Laidlaw drafted the state agency's
complaint, paid the filing fee, and settled the state enforcement action by agreeing to a
relatively modest fine and vaguely promising to address the source of the. violations."
Spence, supra note 1, at 940. While this sham was later uncovered and rejected because
it was not "diligent prosecution, it is a prime example of how state agencies (who, we
will discuss later, favor a compliance approach) can frustrate enforcement efforts.
46. As David Markell describes,
there is a great deal of disagreement over the appropriate government strate-
gies to promote compliance. Many states disagree with EPA's vision that de-
terrence-based enforcement must be a central part of a government enforce-
ment and compliance program. They urge, instead, that more flexible and
regulated party-friendly approaches are superior. They argue that carrots
work better than sticks and that enforcement and compliance policy needs to
evolve to reflect this reality.
Markell, supra note 1, at 110. Others working in the field believe that "traditional en-
forcement methods can actually stand as a barrier to enhancing regulated entities' un-
derstanding of what is required." Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental
Enforcer, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,253, 10,254 (1996), as quoted in Markell, supra note 1,
at4.
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level and may face externally imposed barriers to doing so. If noncom-
pliance has both voluntary and involuntary components, how should we
think about the involuntary aspects?
To set this out more clearly, let's leave the messy world of envi-
ronmental enforcement and imagine instead a simple, generic case of
noncompliance-a driver exceeding the speed limit. What does compli-
ance theory tell us about why the driver might be speeding and how he
should be most effectively brought into compliance?
The sanction model predicts that people speed because they want
to get somewhere quickly or they like driving fast and they know it's
worth their while. Either it is likely they will not be caught or, even if
they are pulled over, the fines will not be very big. The chance of detec-
tion is low, the chance of serious punishment lower still. The way to
slow the driver down is obvious. Because sanctions deter profit-
maximizers, we need to make him think twice before zooming down the
road-i.e., more traffic cops to catch him and bigger fines once he's
caught. And we see this every day on the highway, as whole lanes of
traffic hit their brakes in unison once a police car comes into view, and
in the marketplace, as radar-detecting "fuzz busters" continue to do a
brisk business.47
There is another possibility for the driver speeding, as well. The
facilitation model suggests that the driver may not realize he's speeding,
and would not do so if he were aware of this. Perhaps he thinks the
speed limit is 65 miles per hour rather than 55 miles per hour. Perhaps
he doesn't realize he's now driving in a school zone. Sanctions might
improve the driver's compliance in this case, but we could ensure his
compliance without sanctions simply by posting more speed limit signs,
flashing "school zone" lights, or building speed bumps, i.e., by facilitat-
ing compliance.
These two explanations for the driver's behavior-rational actor
and good apple-seem to cover well the likely reasons for driving too
fast. In this regard, they provide a useful test case. After all, if the cur-
rent models of noncompliance work well in describing speeding and
provide useful insights for traffic enforcement, they likely describe well
the more complicated environmental field, as well.
47. "Fuzzbusters" are readily available to purchase in stores and over the Internet.
See, e.g., http://www.fuzzbusters.com (last visited April 11, 2002);
http://www.sounddomain.com (last visited April 11, 2002); http://www.whistier-
radar.com (last visited April 11, 2002), just to name a few.
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Our sense of the models' adequacy may start to change, how-
ever, if we flip this example around. Do they have the same predictive
power in the case of driving too slowly? This related problem can be
explained by current models, but not entirely.
Under the rational actor theory, people may drive too slowly be-
cause they are uneasy with high speeds or perhaps they are dialing a cell
phone number. As above, they do so either because they believe they
won't be caught or because the fines for driving too slow aren't very big.
Sanctions will deter such profit-maximizing individuals, so we need big-
ger fines and more cops as a deterrent. And similarly, as above, the
compliance facilitation model predicts that people probably do not real-
ize they're driving too slowly. Perhaps the speed limit has changed and
they believe they are in a 25-miles-per-hour zone, rather than one with a
limit of 45 mph. We may need more speed limit signs to catch their at-
tention.
Consider, though, whether there may be a third possibility for a
car driving too slowly-a traffic jam. In this case, the driver is not going
too slowly because he thinks he can get away with it or because he did
not see the speed limit sign change. Here he's driving too slowly because
everyone else is driving too slowly. In other words, we need to widen
our frame beyond the offending car.
This raises a different kind of problem. The offending behavior
is due not to malign intent, confusion, or benign neglect. Even if they
wanted to, drivers stuck in a traffic jam couldn't drive faster. Unlike the
prior examples, there is an additional impediment to compliance-the
systems barrier. It doesn't matter if the drivers are good or bad apples.
Here, the party's behavior is determined by what else is happening on
the road and with other cars.
It goes without saying that there are significant differences be-
tween driving below the speed limit and environmental violations, but
the examples share some important similarities. Traffic cops can focus
on the fact that a single car is driving too slowly, but neither sanction
nor education of the offending driver will make a difference. After all,
the rational explanation of a traffic jam is simply that each person is try-
ing to avoid hitting the car in front of them. Knowing this does not help
us solve or avoid traffic jams if we only focus on individual drivers. The
slow driving only makes sense if considered in its full context and the
systemic concerns that created these conditions are addressed (overall
number of cars on the road, poor merge lanes, driving conditions, etc.).
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Similarly, focusing on a specific environmental violation can be
explained simplistically-the facility did not fill out a particular report
correctly. But this, we suggest, may risk missing the underlying root
cause, particularly if it was not intentional. Is it possible that, just as a
car stuck in traffic may drop well below the speed limit despite the
driver's best efforts, a regulated party may fail to approach full compli-
ance despite good faith efforts?
To that question, advocates both of the rational polluter/sanction
model and of the good apple/facilitation model may simply protest that
this analogy doesn't work in the first place. After all, the police don't
give tickets for driving too slowly in a traffic jam. That's not against the
law.48 And to this we respond: Precisely-that's exactly our point! It
seems ridiculous to give a ticket to someone in a traffic jam because they
were constrained, regardless of their intentions, to drive slowly. But if
similar systemic pressures lead to certain types or levels of environ-
mental noncompliance that are not easily explained by other models,
should we not regard these as regulatory traffic jams, as well, when de-
signing enforcement strategies? While this may run perilously close to
48. Most states regulate minimum speed limits, and regard driving too slow as a
violation if it impedes the reasonable progress of other cars. The provisions in Wyo-
ming's law (below) are similar to those in many states.
Minimum speed limits
(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede
the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is
necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.
(b) Whenever the superintendent or local authorities within their respective
jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic investiga-
tion that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently impede the nor-
mal and reasonable movement of traffic, the superintendent or local authority
may determine and declare a minimum speed limit below which no person
shall drive a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation or in compli-
ance with law and that limit is effective when posted upon appropriate fixed
or variable signs.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-304 (LexisNexis 2001).
See also, e.g., Alabama-ALA. CODE § 32-5A-174 (2001); Arizona-ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
28-704 (2001); Arkansas-ARK.CODE ANN. § 27-51-208 (2001); California-CAL. VEH.
CODE § 22400 (2001); Colorado-COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1103 (2001); Con-
necticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-220 (2001); Delaware-21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
21 § 4171 (2001); Florida-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.183 (2001); Georgia-GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-184 (2001); Hawaii-HAw. REV. STAT. § 291C-102 (2001); Illinois-625
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-606 (2001); Indiana-IND. CODE § 9-21-5-8 (2001); Kansas-
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1561(2001); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:63(2001),
cited in New York v. William G. Beeney, 694 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1999) (County Court,
Monroe County, New York).
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sounding like an apology for environmental violations, shouldn't we ask
ourselves whether some noncompliance in environmental law is more
like speeding or traffic jams?
One might argue that the better analogy is mass speeding. If eve-
ryone is driving at least five miles over the speed limit, it seems unfair to
sanction any particular driver for doing so. The driver is simply follow-
ing everyone else and slowing down might actually be more dangerous
than speeding. We regard this as a poor analogy, though, because it is
simply a specific example of the rational actor model. If there are some
police visibly parked on the side of the road, rest assured the average
speed will quickly become 55 miles per hour.
To even begin to assess value of the traffic jam analogy, we first
need to consider what a regulatory traffic jam would look like. One
might assume, for example, that a regulatory traffic jam would show up
as similar types of violations that occur across the industry. Thus one
might imagine that most companies are violating regulation X, regard-
less of their prior compliance records, corporate ethic, or funding for
environmental health and safety programs. That is, whether the compa-
nies are good or bad apples has no predictive value because there is no
correlation between the violators and their overall compliance rate with
Regulation X.
We do not consider this an example of a traffic jam, however,
because the situation is likely due to the qualities of the regulation itself.
Perhaps the regulation is ambiguous, perhaps contradictory or exces-
sively stringent. In any case, the problem can likely be addressed by fo-
cusing on the regulation itself.
By contrast, in our view a traffic jam results from systems barri-
ers, not specific regulations. Thus let's imagine we could identify good
and bad apples across an industry sector. We can also identify overall
compliance rates both for each facility and for the industry sector as a
whole. What should we think if we find that across the board there-is a
relatively high rate of overall noncompliance, and only some of it ap-
pears to correlate closely with behavioral characteristics associated with
earnest compliance efforts? Increasing inspections and penalties allows
us to remove the bad apples from the sample size. This lowers the non-
compliance rate, but still leaves a significant level of noncompliance.
But even with significant compliance facilitation and compliance sanc-
tioning, we are left with a residual noncompliance rate well above what
we might expect from background stochastic events. If this were happen-
ing, we believe it would provide evidence of a regulatory traffic jam-
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noncompliance that cannot be accounted for by the rational actor and
good apple models. As Part IV sets out, we believe there is good evi-
dence describing this very situation.
This distinction is more than subtle, for if regulatory traffic jams
do occur, neither the rational polluter/sanction model nor the good ap-
ple/facilitation model is useful in understanding and addressing the com-
ponent of noncompliance attributable to the "jam." The rational polluter
model is unhelpful in understanding the noncompliance behavior, be-
cause the level of noncompliance may well be below that which even a
shrewd rational actor would choose in the absence of the systemic jam-
ming effect. Sanctioning their shortfall in compliance would be more
than unfair; it would be irrational. And the good apple model is also un-
helpful, because it will be difficult to tell good apples from bad and, in
any event, conventional facilitation efforts for the good apples, such as
education, "hot lines," and clear and concise explanations of the rules,
are likely to prove as futile as would explaining to a driver stuck in a
traffic jam where the gas pedal is. In short, traffic jams, whether of the
transportation or regulation variety, aren't about whether those stuck in
them are being rational or are in need of education. Rather, they are
about a defect in the system as a whole.
A. A Systems Primer
What might account for high levels of background noncompli-
ance that cannot be easily accounted for by the rational actor or good
apple models? We believe the answer lies in system effects. It is beyond
the scope of this article to explore in detail the impacts of system effects
on compliance, 49 but the paragraphs below set out briefly the major is-
sues raised by diversity and feedback.
The legal system may be regarded as a complex adaptive system
because its components interact with one another.50 This insight has re-
sulted in an avalanche of scholarship on the application of complex sys-
tems theory to the legal system. Authors have used a systems approach
to examine corporate law, civic republicanism, constitutional decision
49. We do this in a current work in progress, entitled The Red Queen, Mozart, and
The Administrative State.
50. See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION: EXPLAINING THE PARADOXICAL
WORLD THROUGH THE SCIENCE OF SURPRISE (Harper Collins 1994); JACK COHEN & IAN
STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIMPLICITY IN A COMPLEX WORLD
(1994); BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMPLEXITY (1996); JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS
COMPLEXITY (Addison-Wesley 1995); STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED
LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE (2001).
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making, jurisprudence, private capital raising, and many other fields."'
System burdens to compliance arise when the various rules are interre-
lated or have relations to indirect or exogenous variables. In the context
of regulated parties, system effects magnify compliance burdens.
Diversity of the components that form the "macroscopic collec-
tion" of a system is the backbone of complex system behavior.5 2 An eco-
system provides a classic example. Because the system as a whole de-
pends on no single component for its long-term operation, though, dis-
crete changes have difficult-to-predict consequences on the overall struc-
ture of the system. Strengthening one component may weaken another.
Complexity theory research suggests that within any complex adaptive
system there exist "conflicting constraints" between the different possi-
ble combinations of components' structural traits.53 These constraints
limit the degree to which any single trait can be adjusted without influ-
encing, positively or negatively, another trait.
54
The phenomenon of conflicting constraints is familiar to the le-
gal system, described in legal literature as the "tradeoffs" problem.
5
51. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Democracy's Discontent in a Complex World: Can
Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel's Civic Republican Com-
munity?, 85 GEO. L. J. 2085 (1997) (critiquing civic republican political theory using
complex systems principles); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signa-
tures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996) (using
chaos theory to evaluate the legislative response to alleged lending discrimination);
Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management
Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998)
(discussing complexity theory in the context of corporate structure, management, and
law); J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Callfor Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State,
45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996) (using complexity theory to develop a general behavioral
model of legal system).
52. See Ricard V. So16 et al., Phase Transitions and Complex Systems, COMPLEXITY,
No. 4 1995, at 13, 23 ("complex systems find one of their brightest examples in the
tropical rainforest").
53. See STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE
LAWS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 169-73 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
54. As an example that many of us studied in biology class, the exoskeleton of an
ant, for example, presents tremendous advantages at the size of an ant, but if ant size
were to increase eventually the proportional weight of the exoskeleton would present the
ant's demise.
55. See, e.g., JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK:
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); Stephen F. Williams, The Era
of Risk-Risk and the Problem of Keeping the APA Up to Date, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375
(1996); Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547
(2000).
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Measures designed to protect imperiled species, for example, have in-
creasingly been identified as threats to private property rights. Complex
systems theory shows why, as policies and the number of rules designed
to implement them increase in number and diversify in objectives, it be-
comes more difficult to strengthen rules related to any one policy objec-
tive without consequences, positive or negative, to the effectiveness of
rules serving other policy objectives. Thus, in the compliance context, it
is not hard to imagine situations when compliance with Regulation X
frustrates compliance with Regulation y. 56 And, more important, when
frustrating compliance with Regulation Y makes compliance with Regu-
lation Z harder, but compliance with Regulation Q easier. In other
words, there is a cascade effect.
This effect is compounded by positive and negative feedback
loops. The response of one component to a particular stimulus can trig-
ger responses from one or several other components, which in turn may
trigger responses from yet additional components. When such flows take
place in the context of complex adaptive systems, the flows themselves
exhibit complex paths known as feedback loops.57 Indeed, the very point
of having legal rules is to take advantage of the anticipated feedback
between the rules and their targeted social problems. Feedback in the
form of deterrent or incentive effects, for example, is the intended result
of legal initiatives designed to prompt responses from the regulated
community. 8 Such feedback loops can become exponential in effect and
59thus dominate the system in which they operate.
The increase of rules and different types of requirements thus
only increases the likelihood of conflicting constraints. Increasing com-
pliance efforts to meet the incremental regulation will, in a number of
56. J.B. Ruhl, for example, was faced with one such example outside of Austin,
Texas. The Soil Conservation Service was telling farmers to cut down cedar trees be-
cause the water-thirsty trees were depleting underground aquifers. At the same time,
however, the Fish and Wildlife Service regarded such conduct as adverse modification
of an endangered songbird that inhabited cedar trees.
57. Adaptation in complex systems is associated with the feedback and feedforward
loops made possible by multiple paths of interactions between system components and
thus "is an emergent property which spontaneously arises through the interaction of
simple components." JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 339 (Penguin
Books 1987).
58. This premise, of course, is the underlying thesis of the rational polluter model
and its justification of deterrence-based environmental regulation policy. See Recht-
schaffen, supra note 3, at 1186-87; Spence, supra note 1, at 937. Virtually every EPA
enforcement policy rests on the efficacy of the deterrence feedback loop. See Silberman,
note 7, at 10,523.
59. See Douglas S. Robertson and Michael C. Grant, Feedback and Chaos in Dar-
winian Evolution, COMPLEXITY, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 10, 12.
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cases at least, undermine compliance with yet another existing or future
rule. And this becomes even more serious as feedback loops kick in.60 As
a result, compliance becomes more than simply a matter of distributing
resources (i.e., balancing opportunity costs), but truly a problem of un-
derstanding complex interactions between responses to one rule and their
effect on the options presented under another. In effect, an act designed
to comply under one rule may limit the options available to comply
elsewhere beyond simply the scarcity of financial resources, and vice
versa.
Moreover, the systems costs from diversity and feedback effects
are not (and, in practical terms, likely cannot be) captured by ex ante
economic analysis. While this is roughly analogous to the problem of
risk-risk tradeoffs, 61 the likely compliance tradeoffs are far harder to
identify so long as rules increase in number and diversify in objectives.
Put another way, as the number of rules increases, the potential for sys-
tem feedback also rises, and the ability to predict the consequences of
feedback triggered by any one new rule diminishes.
As a general matter, then, a certain level of indeterminancy in
the legal system, whether one believes it is normatively positive or nega-
tive in sociolegal effect, is inherent. Compliance is not merely a chain of
transaction-cost decisions about whether to comply and how much to
invest in the effort. Unlimited good intentions and money to back them
up cannot avoid the fact that the options available to confront a particu-
lar regulatory compliance problem are influenced by legal doctrines and
regulations that may have nothing directly to do with the problem at
hand. There is no way to avoid the problem of system burdens, because
there is no way to have a legal system that does not exhibit properties of
a system. Hence, there is no way to demand compliance with the legal
system without expecting some level of noncompliance. But systems, to
be adaptive, sustaining, and resilient, must exhibit the very properties
that can lead to system burdens.
60. One example is the effect land development regulation can have toward, ironi-
cally, accelerating land development. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Natural Preservation
and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1995) (describing the "race to de-
velop.").
61. Much of the tradeoffs literature posits that by using more rigorous risk tradeoff
analysis, legal institutions can predict and control for the effects of conflicting con-
straints. See, e.g., GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 55 (advocating implementing a com-
prehensive risk tradeoff analysis program for public health and environmental protection
laws). Some authors, however, are less sanguine that tradeoff analysis can avoid becom-
ing biased by the way regulation is framed. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs
of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
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IV. PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES ON TRAFFIC JAMS IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL COMPLIANCE
To a certain extent, our argument to date has resembled Sherlock
Holmes' focus on "the dog that didn't bark." 62 If, upon removing the
obvious causes of noncompliance, i.e., violations we would expect under
the rational polluter and facilitation models, we are still left with
significant noncompliance, then there must be another cause at work.
The preceding section proposed a likely suspect-system effects.
Without some empirical evidence, however, it is hard to judge whether
this argument is helpful insight or misguided musings. To justify the
notion of regulatory traffic jams as worthy of serious consideration, we
now move beyond informed speculation to harder data.
A. Root Causes
The best place to start is with the most comprehensive study to
date of environmental compliance behavior, a report known as Root
Causes.6 3 This was the result of an unusual alliance. For three years,
from 1996-1998, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) and
EPA worked together to understand better the underlying causes of non-
compliance. Their joint study sought to identify the key factors behind
noncompliance, examine how facilities respond to noncompliance
events, and assess the value of environmental management systems.
Unlike previous compliance studies by academics or government offi-
cials interviewing companies, this truly was a partnership between regu-
lated and regulator, with CMA encouraging cooperation and frank an-
swers by its member companies.
CMA contacted fifty of its members' facilities that had been par-
ties to environmental enforcement action between 1990 and 1995, ex-
plained the Root Causes project, and sent them an extensive survey. The
identity of the respondents was confidential. Of those contacted, over
half (twenty-seven facilities involved in forty-seven actions) returned the
surveys. The survey then asked the facilities to categorize each type of
62. In the story, Inspector Gregory asks Sherlock Holmes, "Is there any other point
to which you would wish to draw my attention?" Holmes replies, "To the curious inci-
dent of the dog in the night-time." Surprised, Gregory responds, "The dog did nothing in
the night-time." And Holmes inimitably points out, "That was the curious incident."
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in SHERLOCK HOLMES SELECTED STORIES 25 (Ox-
ford University Press ed., 1951).
63. U.S. EPA & CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS Ass'N, EPA/CMA ROOT CAUSE
ANALYSIS PILOT PROJECT: AN INDUSTRY SURVEY (1999), available at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ccsmd/rootcause (last visited April 11, 2002).
64. Id. at 6-7.
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noncompliance event, select no more than three main reasons for the
violation from a range of over 70 potential causes, including "ambiguity
of the regulation," "inadequate compliance funding," and "insufficient
compliance monitoring.'
65
The types of violations identified were not particularly surpris-
ing. The four major categories of noncompliance were "report submis-
sions and reporting," "permit exceedances," "operations and mainte-
nance," and "record keeping." Any inspector would likely have pre-
dicted this. The causes given for these violations, though, were both un-
expected and instructive.
Overall, the categories of "Regulations and Permits" tied with
"Human Error" as the leading root cause of violations. Under the "Regu-
lations and Permits" category, the specific causes of noncompliance
were ignorance ("facility unaware of applicability of a regulation") and
interpretation ("inconsistent interpretation of federal regulations").
While surely part of the causal chain of noncompliance, though, these
are hardly the root causes. The root cause in those cases is whatever it is
that makes the regulation ambiguous or the facility unaware.
And what of "Human Error?" It proved to be a key source of
trouble for every type of violation. For the category of report submis-
sions and reporting, "Human Error" proved the single most important
root cause, accounting for 35% of violations. "Human Error" was the
second most important cause of operations and maintenance violations
(27%), the top cause for record keeping (38%), and responsible for a
significant percentage of physical exceedance violations, as well.66 And
what did the category of human error include? The category's three main
components were "individual responsibility or professional judgment,"
"fatigue," and "inexperience. '67
Surely professional judgment and inexperience are root causes
for some violations, but for these to represent the top cause of noncom-
pliance, responsible for more than one-quarter of all violations, beggars
belief. What, then, are we-to make of these results? Rather than a mean-
ingful explanation for noncompliance, it seems far more likely that Root
Causes treats the "Human Error" category as a repository for noncom-
pliance events unexplained by the more tangible causes, the assumption
being, presumably, that if the regulations were clear and the resources
65. Id. at App. C.
66. Id. at 14 - 22.
67. Id.
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for achieving compliance were sufficient, somebody must have simply
goofed.68
No doubt mistakes happen; yet, according to the Root Causes re-
sults, goofs are one of the most significant causes of noncompliance.
This does not withstand scrutiny. Indeed one might as well call the
"Human Error" category, "hobgoblins," instead. Consider that the U.S.
chemical industry is arguably the most experienced sector in the country
when it comes to environmental compliance. As an industry, chemical
plants are subject to all the major pollution statutes and have experi-
enced health, safety and environment departments as well as environ-
mental management systems. 69 These are sophisticated companies and it
is hard to believe the main cause for their violations is simply people
screwing up. Indeed, even when facilities identified by EPA as "Envi-
ronmental Leaders" have known well beforehand that they would be in-
spected (as happened in EPA's Environmental Leadership Program),
there still were numerous violations.7° Importantly, no causal category
68. The root cause category of Human Error included three causes: "individual
responsibility or professional judgment," "fatigue, lack of alertness, distraction," "inex-
perience, lack of knowledge, lack of technical expertise." Id. at App. C-2.
69. Spence, supra note 1, at 977 ("the CMA provided its members with a kind of
continuous compliance education, making them uncommonly well-versed in the details
and nuances of the regulatory scheme").
70. Spence, supra note i, at 954:
One of EPA's pilot programs, the Environmental Leadership Program (ELP),
sought to recognize and learn from "environmental leaders," companies
whose environmental management and compliance systems were particularly
forward thinking and sophisticated. In June 1994, the EPA announced the
creation of the ELP and invited proposals for pilot projects that would dem-
onstrate state of the art compliance management systems and produce knowl-
edge that could be transferred to other facilities and settings. The program
was limited to companies that: (i) had a good compliance history and sophis-
ticated environmental management systems; (ii) regularly used environmental
auditing; (iii) were willing to share their expertise with others; and (iv) would
involve both employees and the general public in their environmental man-
agement systems. The twelve private facilities selected for the first pilot
phase of the program were owned by large, sophisticated organizations with
substantial environmental compliance experience.
See also Spence, supra note I, at 975:
During the pilot phase of the ELP, audits were carefully planned in advance
and designed to allow participating firms to demonstrate their sophisticated
environmental management and auditing systems to the EPA. The audits in-
cluded regulators and representatives of the firms, and each firm knew ahead
of time when the audit would take place and had ample time to prepare. Nev-
ertheless, in nearly every environmental audit performed under the ELP, vio-
lations were discovered. Consistent with the special EPA enforcement policy
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used in Root Causes corresponds explicitly with our concept of a traffic
jam from systems effects.
B. ABA Survey
Our second source of data comes from a survey we conducted of
randomly-selected environmental law attorneys to detect their level of
concern about involuntary noncompliance and to identify its possible
sources. We sent our survey to 500 randomly-selected members of the
American Bar Association's Section of the Environment, Energy, and
Resources (SEER). We chose SEER because it is a prominent forum for
leading practitioners of environmental law in private practice, govern-
ment, academic, and other practice settings.71
We designed our survey to elicit the respondents' perceptions for
three topics relevant to compliance policy. 72 First, a series of questions
devised for ELP participants, the violations were corrected, and no penalties
were imposed. But, the important point is this: even with time to prepare and
an incentive to perform well, these sophisticated firms did not achieve perfect
compliance.
•71. Of the 500 surveys sent, 168 completed surveys were returned. We grouped this
respondent population using several personal characteristics called for in the survey's
opening questions. First, because of our interest in determining the influence of gov-
ernment work on perceptions of regulatory compliance, we divided respondents into
three practice setting categories: (1) those who had spent their entire practice careers
representing industry in positions such as private law firms, in-house counsel, or trade
associations, which accounted for half of the respondents; (2) those who had spent all or
a part of their practice careers in a government position, regardless of other experience,
which defined one-third of the respondents; and (3) all others, meaning those who had
no government work but also some experiences other than representing industry, such as
judicial or academic.
To detect whether the resources of a regulated business affect compliance per-
ceptions, we further subdivided the respondents who currently represent businesses or
did so in the past according to the size of client predominantly represented. We based
size on Fortune 500 status and number of employees, with categories for large (27 per-
cent), medium (8 percent), small (25 percent), balanced (no predominant client type) (31
percent), and other (9 percent). Finally, because the volume and type of environmental
regulation may vary across types of industries, we also characterized the respondents'
clients according to four industry sectors: (1) manufacturing; (2) land and resource
development; (3) transportation and utilities; and (4) services. Most respondents, it
turned out, spanned more than one sector.
The survey was voluntary and responses were anonymous. We greatly appreci-
ate SEER's cooperation in providing the member names and their contact information
(SEER did not commission, direct, or in any other way influence the design or imple-
mentation of the survey). All funding for the survey and the data analysis was provided
by The Florida State University College of Law.
72. Since the responses called for in our survey are clearly ordinal in nature, we used
the logistic regression method of statistical analysis for answering various questions of inter-
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asked respondents to describe their perceptions of their own ability to
assess environmental compliance and of their clients' ability to achieve
compliance. Expecting that at least some respondents would report sig-
nificant levels of noncompliance, another group of questions probed the
respondents' perceptions of the institutional effects noncompliance has
on businesses. We did so to determine whether respondents would iden-
tify effects other than those consistent with the rational actor model, as
well as to see whether the respondents believe noncompliance is a seri-
ous concern. Turning to the heart of the matter, a group of questions then
asked respondents to identify the sources of noncompliance. We closed
the survey with questions about the solutions the respondents would rec-
ommend for reducing noncompliance, both within businesses and as a
matter of policy.
1. Prevalence of Noncompliance
Environmental lawyers representing business clients have the
unenviable task, day in and day out, of assessing their clients' level of
compliance for past, present, and future activities. We designed a series
of questions, limited to respondents who currently represent businesses
or did so in the past, to capture what environmental attorneys think about
regulation and compliance. We were not surprised to find that, overall,
they think compliance is difficult both to assess and to achieve.
With respect to compliance assessment, a significant portion of
the respondents said they find the task difficult for paperwork regula-
tions (e.g., record keeping and reporting) and physical violations (e.g.,
discharge and disposal violations). Indeed, when asked whether they
agree with the statement that they can confidently assess absolute levels
of compliance, roughly equal numbers agreed and disagreed:
est throughout our study. For example, to determine the influence of government work on
perceptions of regulatory compliance, we treated the three practice setting categories as the
explanatory variable X, and the responses to perceptions of regulatory compliance were
coded on a scale from I to k; for example, 1-5 corresponding to strongly agree, agree, indif-
ferent, disagree and strongly disagree. The score for each question was treated as the re-
sponse variable Y and the k possible scores of Y are called the response categories. The
principal objective of a statistical analysis is to investigate the relationship between the ex-
planatory variable X and the response variable Y. The ordinal nature of the responses leads
naturally to statistical models based on the cumulative response probabilities of observing
response categories less than or equal to a given score j, when the covariate is X. More spe-
cifically, we are interested in investigating the influence of the explanatory variable X on the
cumulative response probability up to and including category j. The logistic regression
method of examining such relationships involves modeling the logarithm of the odds of the
event of observing response categories up to and including category j as a function of the
explanatory variable X through a linear regression equation.
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strongly agree indifferent disagree strongly
agree I disagree
Paperwork 13 36 12 28 11
Physical 9 38 13 31 9
One factor that may complicate compliance assessment is the
sheer number and complexity of the regulations involved. Indeed, the
vast majority of respondents said they find keeping track of environ-
mental regulations difficult. None described the task as easy, and only
14 percent found it moderately difficult, whereas 40 percent said it is a
difficult task and 43 percent found it very difficult.
As difficult as they believe it is to assess compliance, many re-
spondents also believe businesses often fall short of the goal. When
asked how consistently their clients achieved full compliance, a startling
number of respondents said they believe their clients did so less than
two-thirds of the time:
always 90 % 66 to 25 % never cannot
estimate
Paperwork <1 40 354 11 14
Physical 2 46 28 8 16
Responses to this series of questions on compliance assessment
and compliance rates generally held true regardless of the respondent's
practice background. Exposure to government work thus did not meas-
urably affect responses. Size and sector of the client base also had no
effect on responses.
Another commonly held notion our respondents' answers did not
support is that the federal government is the principal source of regula-
tory overload. Although EPA clearly is the most prominent (and perhaps
prolific) environmental agency, a significant majority of the respondents
(63 percent) agreed that levels of noncompliance are the same for fed-
eral, state, and local regulations. Of those who identified a particular
level of regulation as spawning more noncompliance, roughly equal
numbers identified federal (19 percent) and state (13 percent) regula-
tions, while local regulations were identified the least (5 percent). What-
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ever its source, therefore, noncompliance does not appear to be a prob-
lem isolated to a particular level of government regulation. The problem,
in other words, is system-wide.
2. Institutional Effects of Noncompliance
We know that it occurs and is hard to assess, but how serious an
institutional concern to businesses is the problem of regulatory noncom-
pliance? The rational polluter model predicts that businesses will per-
ceive of noncompliance as simply a cost of doing business, whereas the
good apple model suggests that businesses will suffer institutional dis-
cordance if noncompliance rates become significant. Our survey results
suggest that both models have some explanatory value. First, the vast
majority of respondents identified significant institutional costs associ-
ated with noncompliance. Respondents agreed or strongly agreed that
noncompliance hurts the corporate public image (eighty-five percent),
creates friction between businesses and government (eighty-one per-
cent), increases administrative costs (eighty-two percent), and demoral-
izes company personnel (seventy-four percent). These response rates
sound like the worries of good apples. On the other hand, consistent with
the rational polluter model, sixty-eight percent of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that noncompliance is simply another business risk to
manage. Perhaps the prevailing compliance behavior is that of a rational
good apple-concerned about the psychic and other nonpecuniary costs
of involuntary noncompliance, but also confronting its consequences as a
risk management issue. In any event, very few respondents-only eight
and a half percent-agreed that noncompliance is not a significant con-
cern. It is difficult to square these results with the notion that all non-
compliance is the result of voluntary, calculated decisions about what is
best for the bottom line.
Respondents with at least some government experience tended to
rate the demoralizing effects of noncompliance as less significant a con-
sequence, but otherwise conformed with results for the study population
as a whole. Client size and sector also had no effect on responses to
these questions.
3. Sources of Noncompliance
The respondents generally agree that noncompliance presents an
array of institutional harms for businesses. But what, other than the de-
liberate decision not to comply, causes noncompliance? To explore that
question more deeply, we culled explanations for involuntary noncom-
pliance found in the compliance behavior literature, particularly the body
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of work developing the good-apple model, and asked our survey popula-
tion to rate each in terms of its importance in contributing to noncompli-
ance. As shown below, the overwhelming majority of our respondents
found many of the factors associated with involuntary noncompliance at
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The big surprises, to us at least, were that the most important
factor by far was the sheer number of regulations, and that the least im-
portant factor was costs of compliance. Most of the literature supporting
the good apple model of environmental compliance behavior focuses on
the complexity, ambiguity, inconsistency, and fluidity of regulations,
qualitative factors that can operate independent of the quantitative num-
ber of regulations. We would not have been surprised to find number of
regulations scoring roughly the same as these other factors, but to have it
rated significantly more important suggests that the quantity of regula-
tions has an effect on compliance at least partly independent of the qual-
ity of the regulations. This suggests that advocates of the good apple
behavioral model have been missing an important factor in support of
their position that external factors generally drive compliance outcomes.
Given how prominent the "cost of compliance" factor is in envi-
ronmental policy dialogue generally, the low score that costs of compli-
ance received in the responses was also a curious result. To be sure, cost
of compliance was rated as at least relevant by three-quarters of the re-
spondents, but the rational polluter model predicts that cost of compli-
ance should be rated the most important factor, as compliance behavior
is purely a cost-benefit decision process. Yet almost a quarter of respon-
dents described cost of compliance as of minor or no significance, and
its scores for very important and important pale in comparison to the
ratings for number of regulations and the factors focusing on qualities of
regulation. For us the important message, is that, regardless of which
model one espouses, the results point strongly toward external sources of
noncompliance that are largely outside the control of businesses.
Also of interest for our purposes is that practice background had
no significant effect on responses to this set of questions. One might
have expected attorneys with government experience to believe the level
of regulation is manageable and that compliance behavior is driven pri-
marily by costs of compliance, but they fell in line with private practi-
tioners in ranking number of regulations highest and cost of compliance
lowest. Of client characteristics, practitioners representing small clients
ranked agency reliance on informal guidance as more important than did
other practitioners, but otherwise client size and sector had no significant
effect.
C. Interpreting Results
No survey can perfectly reflect reality. Questions may be unclear
or overbroad. Respondents may lie or, despite best intentions, respond in
a self-serving and misleading manner. In our ABA survey, for example,
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there surely exists the possibility that some private sector respondents
downplayed too much the possibility that costs drive compliance deci-
sions to avoid seeming crass or focused on the bottom line. They may
have over-emphasized the importance of the number of rules and their
complexity, or the aggressiveness of enforcement efforts, so that non-
compliance would seem less culpable.73 On the other hand, respondents
in government and who had government practice experience answered
no differently on these questions than respondents whose entire practice
experience was in the private sector, suggesting that self-serving bias
was not a significant factor.
Another hole in the empirical record may be that the category of
"human error" in the Root Causes study was too broad to enable analysis
of what lies behind it. While it may fairly be described as a "residual"
noncompliance category, other factors besides regulatory system traffic
jams may explain some or all of its incidence. But its incidence was sig-
nificant-a leading explanation given for noncompliance in many
forms-and no other explanations spring immediately to mind.
It is clear, as well, that much (perhaps most) noncompliance in
companies can be accounted for by the rational polluter and good apple
models. The lack of strong enforcement at the state level, for example,
clearly drives a good deal of noncompliance. Over three-quarters of the
delegable environmental programs have been taken over by states and,
as a result, states carry out about 90% of site inspections nationwide and
bring 80-90% of enforcement actions. 74 But in many cases, EPA, the
GAO and environmental groups have alleged, their implementation and
enforcement of environmental law have been weak.75
73. See, e.g., Companies Say EPA Enforcement Policy Collides with Voluntary
Audit Programs, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 117, at A-7 (June 21, 1994) (reporting
that private attorneys argue that aggressive enforcement can frustrate voluntary compli-
ance initiatives).
74. ECOS, The Environmental Council of the States, available at
http://www.sso.org/ecos/, cited in Markell, supra note 1, at 32.
75. This was a major focus of David Markell's article. He found:
1. Inadequate Monitoring of Regulated Parties .... Problems exist in both
the quantity and quality of monitoring conducted. For example, in a March
1998 audit the OIG found that "over one-third of the major facilities in New
Mexico had not received an inspection in more than 7 years."...
2. Failure to Pursue "Timely and Appropriate" Enforcement Against Signifi-
cant Air Violators .... The OIG identified substantial deficiencies in states'
enforcement actions against significant violators ("SVs"). In audits of Penn-
sylvania, Arkansas, and Texas, for example, the OIG found that "enforcement
actions against SVs were not timely." ...
3. Failure to Recover Economic Benefit in Appropriate Cases. In a 1997 air
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Nevertheless, even if one discounts the survey responses as a re-
sult of respondent self-interest and overbroad categories, and even if one
accepts that much noncompliance can be accounted for by the rational
polluter and good apple models, the data are still sufficient to establish
three important points. First, noncompliance at industrial facilities is the
norm, not the exception. And this is the case even at sophisticated facili-
ties with special departments focused on ensuring compliance. More-
over, the rates of noncompliance are significant, beyond what one might
expect from stochastic events. Second, complex, externally imposed
constraints, largely in the form of qualitative and quantitative character-
istics of the regulations themselves, resonate with the practicing bar as a
significant obstacle to compliance. Hence the survey results are not con-
sistent with the rational polluter model explanation for most noncompli-
ance. Finally, the Root Causes study demonstrates that a good deal of
noncompliance cannot be explained by discrete, identifiable causes such
as complexity or contradictory regulations. This shows that the good
apple model has shortcomings, as well. As our hypothetical in Part III
predicted, the data describe a situation where the level of noncompliance
cannot be fully accounted for by the rational actor and good apple mod-
els. Overall, something else seems to be going on.
V. SPOTTING TRAFFIC JAMS
Even if we assume that regulatory traffic jams exist, is this a
practical rather than purely descriptive insight? In fact, it is both. The
possibility of regulatory traffic jams suggests that the fundamental prem-
ises of conventional compliance theory are incomplete. The addition of a
system-level operational factor such as the traffic jam model, it could be
expected, will necessarily alter the way in which we conceive of and
enforcement audit of several states and Regions, the OIG noted that EPA
"[r]egions and a few delegated agencies used the economic benefit compo-
nent of penalties to deter companies from violations, in accordance with
EPA's Penalty Policy. Most delegated agencies, however, did not consis-
tently consider or appropriately assess the economic benefit ... we observed
that the states are generally much less strict than EPA when administering
penalties for RCRA violations."
4. Inconsistency in the Approaches Used to Pursue Enforcement and Compli-
ance and in the Level of Enforcement Activity. The 1997 OIG RCRA audit
found considerable variability in state performance in the area of enforce-
ment, noting that "there were inconsistent penalty practices between states
that can result in inconsistent enforcement of RCRA-regulated facilities from
one state to another.".... The auditors believe, in short, that "it is critical
that the enforcement programs within authorized states are at least as strict as
the EPA program," and that obtaining strong monetary penalties is a "critical
component" of effective environmental enforcement programs.
Markell, supra note I, at 44-47.
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address noncompliance. Should an incident of noncompliance be sanc-
tioned, trigger compliance facilitation assistance, or be tolerated? If the
sanction is challenged, how should prosecutorial discretion be exercised
reasonably? How could regulatory traffic jams be raised as a defense?
These are important practical consequences of the regulatory traffic jams
model, but evaluating them is complicated by a severe descriptive chal-
lenge-identifying and defining regulatory traffic jams. Indeed, it is on
this descriptive challenge that we focus our closing remarks and recom-
mendations on regulatory traffic jams, not because the practical issues
are unimportant or mundane, but rather because description of system-
level factors such as regulatory traffic jams is woefully lacking in the
field of regulatory compliance theory. This is, we believe, the critical
first step toward a more complete picture of the noncompliance problem.
As we mentioned in Part III, the possibility of a third model of
noncompliance has important implications for the other dominant mod-
els. If regulatory traffic jams do occur, then good and bad apples will
become "stuck" in noncompliance, and it won't matter which they are in
terms of compliance responses. If we rely on a bad-apple model, we
would respond through a sanction approach, and it would be as irrelevant
as writing a ticket to a car stuck in traffic. If we rely on a good-apple
model, we would face the same problem. Telling an idling car to step on
the gas doesn't help. Neither sanction nor compliance facilitation will
solve a systems problem.
One might reasonably believe that focusing on traffic jams
should change the behavior of enforcement officials. But could they rec-
ognize a traffic jam when they saw it?
The task of an enforcement official recognizing a traffic jam is
deeply problematic for one simple reason-an inspector cannot easily
observe all of industry in the absence of a continuous flow of compre-
hensive, real-time compliance performance data. Put another way, imag-
ine you are a traffic cop and detect a car driving too slowly. You cannot
decide whether the driver is caught in a traffic jam, and therefore not
culpable, unless you can also look at the cars in front and behind. Indeed
in many states driving too slowly is only against the law if it impedes the
reasonable progress of other cars. By its very nature, it will always be
difficult to pinpoint a systems effect unless the entire system is within
the scope of observation. In our example of regulatory traffic jams, we
postulated a high level of noncompliance across the industry, despite
good faith efforts. But this does not indicate which specific violation
may have resulted from a systemic effect any more than observing a lo-
cal rainstorm can tell us whether it is due to climate change. Surely some
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regulated parties would try to excuse noncompliance as "involuntary"
and "good faith." But identifying the real cause is important, because the
enforcement responses are different. Thus a key challenge is to deter-
mine what factors we would use to identify traffic jam violations and
distinguish them from bad-actor noncompliance or good-apple inadver-
tance. Put another way, one threshold question is whether inspectors can
determine that what they observe as noncompliance is in fact the result
of a traffic jam.
The short answer is "no," not in any meaningful sense. Unlike a
traffic cop, who might move swiftly on a motorcycle through jammed
cars and assume vantage points to view the cause and backed-up cars
well into the distance, a regulatory compliance field inspector is to a
large extent limited to observing only one or a few "cars" at a time.
Noncompliance at that level of detail and pace of observation simply
reduces to observation of discrete events. Identifying the patterns and
symptoms of an industry-wide regulatory traffic jam is beyond any one
person's capacity under those circumstances. Of course, an experienced
inspector may begin to detect patterns over time, to hear and see the
same story unfold countless times, to exchange those stories with col-
leagues, and begin to wonder whether there isn't some more holistic ex-
planation at work besides "goofs." But how would he or she confirm that
suspicion?
Although much stock has been placed in both of the conventional
models of regulatory compliance behavior, in truth, both rest at bottom
on behavioral theories that postulate indicia of the respective behavioral
trait and then rely for confirmation through the trial and error of policy
responses. The two models predict cause and effect: If you do X to this
regulated party, Y will follow. The good apple model, for example, rests
on prescribed behavioral traits of the good apple, such as adoption of
environmental management systems and well-funded corporate compli-
ance efforts, and postulates that a policy of facilitation will work with
those traits to improve compliance performance. We "find" good apples
under this model when facilitation policies actually do correlate with
improved compliance performance (though in the end we can never be
sure that true good apple ethic and not the bottom line was the reason).
Similarly, the rational polluter model is simply a theory of self-interested
economic behavior, one we can test by observing responses to different
sanction and incentive policies. When a firm's behavioral response
elides with the model's prediction, we have identified a rational actor
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(though we can never be sure compliance wasn't motivated by sheer
good will).
76
So, how do we "find" regulatory traffic jams? Simple-do it in
the same manner, by developing a theory of the behavioral trait and de-
signing policies to test for its presence and adjust for its effects. One
reviewer of an early draft of this paper likened our argument to that of
astronomers proving the existence of "dark matter" in the universe. Once
astronomers have accounted for all known sources of matter, there is still
a large amount that must exist but that cannot be located by current sens-
ing technology. Similarly, to date, conventional environmental policy
has largely been designed to test, confirm, and react to only the two
established, and in large part opposing, behavioral models, both of which
operate at firm-specific levels. The EPA and other environmental agen-
cies have only recently begun to consider seriously that they may be part
of the problem, and even then with little attention to system-level ef-
fects.
Notwithstanding the tremendous amount of attention environ-
mental agencies, policy analysts, and scholars have paid to "regulatory
reinvention," it has been pitched primarily as a refinement of the sanc-
tion and facilitation models, and thus intended to be channeled through
the firm-specific behavioral responses predicted under the rational-
polluter and good-apple models. Little attention has been paid to the
systems level question. The relevant question under the systems model is
whether there is a component of noncompliance that does not respond to
sanction and facilitation policies that are intended to illicit firm-specific
behavioral responses. To answer this will require (1) identifying in-
stances when sanction and facilitation policies do not lead to improve-
ments in compliance performance, (2) doing so on a statistically mean-
ingful basis across industrial sectors and regulatory programs, and (3)
testing the effect alternative policy responses have on this identified
component of noncompliance. Of course, regulatory agencies will have a
disincentive to undertake either task: The first suggests flaws in current
policy, the second is a daunting undertaking, the third ventures into the
unknown and risks failure.
Indeed, agencies may protest, "why do any of this, instead of
squeezing out the final increment of noncompliance by putting more
resources into sanction and facilitation?" The answer is that, as we have
76. Indeed, to a certain extent the good and bad apple models are rather arbitrary
categories for sorting purposes. Why, for example, should compliance to avoid costs
(which is regarded as a bad apple behavior) be considered different than compliance to
avoid bad public relations (a good apple motivation)?
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demonstrated, this final increment appears to be neither insignificant nor
responsive to additional sanction and facilitation resources, even of the
reinvented variety. If we believe that solving this increment of "residual"
or "unexplained" noncompliance will yield environmental benefits that
justify the policy investment (a matter we will assume for these pur-
poses),77 the time seems ripe for considering a third possible explanation
for its presence-the regulatory traffic jam-and designing appropriate
policy responses. Yet nobody has done a very good job of explaining the
indicia of a traffic jam, much less describing the problem in these terms.
And what might those policy responses look like? The two con-
ventional behavioral models have their respective policy response mod-
els: The rational-polluter model leads to sanction-based policies; the
good-apple model leads to facilitation-based policies. Our systems
model leads, not surprisingly, to systems-based policies. In the world of
transportation, chronic traffic jams pose serious, if not the most serious,
solution design challenges. Any day's rush hour traffic jam may be eased
by removing a broken-down car from the road, but true gridlock is not so
easy to solve. Transportation experts move to system models of traffic
flow, road capacity, and other system behavior characteristics. The point
is that if the system is the problem, the solution is to change the sys-
tem-a new interchange, another lane, an alternative route. So, too, it
must be in the case of regulatory traffic jams. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the policy implication is that programs such as EPA's Project XL
and other "alternative path" initiatives are on the right track, for they
fundamentally alter the manner in which the system behaves. 78 These
and other initiatives drive the creation of environmental management
systems-business frameworks that treat ensuring compliance as a sys-
tems problem.
We are not by any means proposing innovation for innovation's
77. This is a huge issue in its own right. The relevance of compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations as an accurate proxy for environmental protection has long been a
contested issue. Unlike with most OSHA regulations, for example, the link between
following a record keeping requirement or permit and improved environmental protec-
tion is often indirect, at best. As described earlier, however, the reliance on self-
monitoring and reporting drives this dependence on creating a paper trail of compliance.
At the end of the day, though, the legitimacy of environmental law derives from its
protection of health and the natural world through compliance with its many mandates,
not the compliance activity itself.
78. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy
And The New Economy, 29 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (2001); Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and
the Special Case: The EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219 (2001);
Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation Of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U.L.
REV. 21 (2001).
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sake, or for the sake of easing up on industry. We also readily admit that
some of the reinvention programs may have created more problems than
they sought to remedy.79 Rather, as previously noted, the first element in
our proposal is the development of far more robust databases and statis-
tical information on the responses of compliance behavior to regulatory
policies. Where sanction and facilitation appear not to move compliance
performance as their respective models would predict, or do so only in-
efficiently, then we suggest that testing regulatory system innovations is
warranted.
While we suspect the environmental regulation system has
reached this point for many industries and programs, we cannot prove it
with the empirical evidence at hand. To be fair, though, the existing data
on noncompliance overall remains weak, meaning that even the rational
actor and good apple models rest on thin empirical ice. 0 We believe that
our traffic jams model rest on sound theorectical foundations, as sound
as the rational actor and good apple models. We do not contend that the
theory explains all of noncompliance, but neither can the theory support-
ing either of the other two models. Rather, we contend that using all
three models leads to a more complete picture of the various factors
leading to regulatory noncompliance. The next step, we therefore urge, is
to modify our ongoing empirical research efforts so they ensure mean-
ingful coverage of the complete theory of noncompliance. What is
needed, in other words, is a concerted effort to test the effectiveness of
all three behavioral models of noncompliance and, carefully and deliber-
ately, design regulatory policies that would take advantage of each.
79. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Myths of the Reinvented State, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev.
223 (2001).
80. As researchers on compliance theory have described,
Scholarly attention has focused much more on building credible arguments
for particular points of view than on evaluating their effectiveness based on
actual experience in the field. As a result, there is little in the way of empiri-
cal evidence that can be used in deciding which enforcement techniques [ap-
proaches based on deterrence or cooperation] are most likely to achieve regu-
latory goals.
Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance with State Environ-
mental Regulations, 12 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 753, 757 (1993) as quoted in
Rechtschaffen, supra note 3, at 1205. Indeed EPA itself has acknowledged that better
data are needed to understand the drivers of compliance and noncompliance. See Sil-
berman, supra note 7 (describing the long-range compliance study underway).
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